reflects a JPL design philosophy of minimizing bpth the number of different materials and the number of parts and physical material interfaces in. order to reduce complexity and interface problems and enhance flight reliability.
IV. TESTING AND INSPECTION PRACTICES
Volumes have been written' on testing and inspection practices that can and do contribute strongly to establishing ultimate reliability and confidence in the total flight rocket motor assembly. Only several major testing aspects will be discussed herein.
A. SQUIBS
Significantly larger test sample sizes are conventionally used to verify the quality of rocket motor squibs as compared to the number of main motor 
B. MOTOR ASSEMBLY TESTING
As indicated previously, most communications satellite programs involve a relatively small number of spacecraft launches, hence the tendency to limit the size of the development and qualification program for each new apogee motor design to minimize program costs. Development and qualification motor firing programs in recent years typically range from a low of 2 or 3 to perhaps as many as 7 or 8. In some programs, the earlier development motors tested may differ from the final qualification configuration in some significant aspect. Therefore, the number of "all-up"' motor tests upon which the motor is qualified can be, and usually is, quite small. handling environments the motor is exposed to prior to flight.
There is some limited evidence that shelf life greatly in excess of the instances, motor flight instrumentation was nonexistent or so limited that it was not possible to verify that the solid motor had actually failed. However, the rocket was one of several prime suspects. Although no reliable figures are available, it is believed that these seven failures probably represented a loss in excess of $100, 000, 000.
As a result of these flight failures there was.a need to reassess rocket motor design, development and flight usage and to identify methods for reducing the likelihood of future failures. Two companion reliability management studies have been completed recently which examined (1) system environmental and applications aspects and (2) solid rocket motor aspects. Five specific flight failures (see Table 3 ) were selected for detailed examination in each of the studies. A summary of the objectives, the study approach, and significant findings are as described below.
A. SYSTEM EFFECTS STUDY
The primary objective of this JPL study was to ascertain whether a common thread could be found between the various failures which could be A condensation of significant findings from the SRI study are:
(1) Each motor contractor has developed a unique combination of design concepts capable of delivery of the required performance with a high degree of reliability.
(2) Each motor contractor provides adequate and strict controls for inert components procured from subcontractors.
(3) Current processing practices (1972) reflect marked improvements over those used during the manufacture of past motors.
One example is the reduced moisture allowables and controls currently used for CTPB propellant formulations and case bond liner systems.
VI. DIAGNOSTIC INSTRUMENTATION
In the majority of flight failures (see Table 3 remarks), a complete loss of signal prevented an analysis which would ascertain the subsystem which failed or the cause of failure. This is due to the lack of diagnostic instrumentation aboard the satellites. The cost, difficulty of implementation, and limited need for diagnostic data have resulted in the elimination of such engineering instrumentation: however, when failure occurs, the need for diagnostic data is imperative.
An analysis has been conducted at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory to determine the performance, typical cost, and unit characteristic of two instrumentation systems (Ref. 12). One was a continuous real-time design;
the second was a hardened (10, 000 g) threshold hybrid design which would have a high probability of data return. The results of the study substantiated that a self-contained independent flight instrumentation module is feasible using state-of-the-art technology and that a common package which could be utilized by many users could be developed.
In order to bound the problem, the capability of the flight instrumentation package was limited to the detection of whether or not the solid motor was the cause of failure and to the identification of probable primary failure modes; however, application of the instrumentation package to other subsystems is possible.
After a review of failure modes, it was determined that measurement of three-axis acceleration, motor chamber pressure, and a limited number of temperatures would be adequate instrumentation. The characteristics of this instrumentation are shown in Table 4 . The key functional and unit characteristics of the two designs are shown in Table 5 . Figure 3 illustrates a conceptual design of a hardened diagnostic instrumentation package. The sensors, of course, are external to this package. Table 6 compares the estimated weight, volume, and development and flight costs for the hardened and unhardened designs.
VII. CONCLUDING RECOMMENDATIONS
The following conclusions derived from the programs discussed above provide a list of options available to motor suppliers, system prime contractors, flight project offices, and responsible NASA and DOD agencies for implementation on future apogee motor programs. Selective upgrade of future apogee motors can result in increasing satellite cost effectiveness by reducing the potential for future flight failures.
( aTotal weight= satellite including apogee motor weight.
To be selected. 
